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No principle is better settled than that the power of a state,

even its power of taxation, in respect to property, is limited
to such as is within its jurisdiction.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

States that impose it, want it badly. Persons subject to it, do not
want to pay it. Further, those arguably in the best position to do so,2
do not want to collect it. What is it? The sales tax's cousin: the use tax.

*Associate attorney, White & Case, Miami, Florida. B.S., 1983, Indiana University; J.D.,
1989, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; LL.M., in taxation, 1990, University of
Florida. The author is a Certified Public Accountant in the State of Indiana.
The author would like to thank everyone who candidly contributed insights and criticisms.
The author would also like to extend his special gratitude to Professor David Hudson, University
of Florida College of Law, whose patience, enlightenment, and encouragement provided a neverending beacon of light to a mind afloat on an endless morass of material.
1. Lake Erie &Western R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628, 646 (1894) (citations omitted).
2. An excise tax is a tax on a privilege. 1 T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION § 45 (4th
ed. 1924). The use tax (also known as the compensating use tax or compensating tax), like the
sales tax, is an excise tax. Id.; J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (5th ed. 1988). While the sales tax is imposed on the

privilege of selling property, the use tax is imposed on the post-purchase privilege of using,
storing, withdrawing, or consuming property within the borders of the taxing jurisdiction. P.
HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
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Forty-five states and the District of Columbia currently impose
some type of sales and use tax.3 As a source of state revenue, sales
and use taxes continue to grow in importance. 4 However, it is unconstitutional5 for a state to impose a sales tax on an interstate sale.6
States therefore impose a use tax when goods from interstate sales,
which are otherwise properly subject to the sales tax of the purchaser's
state, subsequently are brought or delivered into the purchaser's state.
The state taxes the purchaser as if the sale were properly subject to
that state's sales tax. The sales and use taxes operate in this complementary manner in all states using a sales and use tax scheme:
7
generally, one or the other applies.
The sales tax and the use tax also share similar collection concerns.
From a practical standpoint, one can imagine the difficulty in collecting
and enforcing a sales tax if ultimate consumers were primarily responsible for remitting the sales tax imposed on consumer purchases. States
that impose a sales tax, therefore, uniformly make the vendor the
state's collection agent.8 When the use tax is involved, the state's

3. See State Tax Guide (P-H) 1 210 (1990). This article concerns state sales and use taxes
imposed at the retail level on tangible personal property.
4. Id. The Tax Guide reported that in 1988 sales tax and gross receipts tax revenues from
all states comprised more than 50% of all states' combined tax revenues. Id.
210-A (table).
See also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION OF OUT-OF-STATE MAIL ORDER SALES 6, 23-25 (1986) [hereinafter ACIR REPORT]
(illustrating sales tax revenues and various comparisons through 1985).
5. Commissioner v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
6. This article will use the term "interstate sale" to denote a sale, namely a mail order
sale, that is constitutionally immune from the imposition of sales tax by the purchaser's state.
In other words, this article will assume in its use of the term "interstate sale" that the seller
is located in a state other than that in which the purchaser resides, title to the property sold
passes in the seller's state, and the seller's only physical contacts with the purchaser's state
consists of the use of the U.S. mail or common carrier to deliver the goods. See Commissioner
v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 328 (1944); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 754-55 (1967).
7. ACIR REPORT, supra note 4, at 24. The example above also illustrates two major
utilities of the use tax. First, it protects a state's sales tax revenue base from erosion due to
immune interstate sales. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 343, reh'g denied, 347
U.S. 964 (1954); ACIR REPORT, supra note 4, at 26. Second, the use tax protects vendors of
the taxing state from artificial price disparities that could otherwise result from purchases of
the same property from out-of-state vendors. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 343. ACIR REPORT,
supra note 4, at 45. The disparity arises because sales tax, usually a percentage of the purchase
price, is not added to the purchase price of property purchased in an immune interstate sale.
This inequity, however, may be ameliorated by the delivery costs (i.e., handling, postage, and
insurance costs) which the interstate purchaser commonly incurs.
8. PRENTICE-HALL'S GUIDE TO SALES AND USE TAXES 28 (1985). This practice has also
been extended to use taxes. Id. at 29.
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collection and enforcement problems increase: the ultimate consumer
becomes the person primarily responsible for remitting payment to
the state. The states contend that consumers simply do not remit the
use taxes due.9
A common situation giving rise to the use tax collection problem
involves the ever increasing volume of out-of-state mail order purchases (i.e., interstate sales) of taxable property.10 The natural solution
to this collection problem appears quite simple: impose a use tax on
interstate sales and make the out-of-state mail order vendor the state's
agent for collecting the use taxes. There is, however, one small problem.
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held in National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Departmentof Revenue" that a state's attempt to compel
an out-of-state mail order vendor to collect a state use tax on purchases
made by the state's residents was unconstitutional when the vendor's
contacts with the state consisted solely of the vendor's use of common
carriers and the United States mail service. A great debate has raged
ever since. The states vehemently contend that this decision results
in increasingly large losses of badly needed tax revenue. 12 The mail
order industry counters that the National Bellas Hess decision fairly
protects its members from the undue burden of complying with the
use tax collection statutes of each state and local taxing entity having
the authority to impose a sales and use tax,13 the number of which
has been estimated to exceed 6500.14
States have been using the judiciary in attempts to lessen the
perceived harshness of the National Bellas Hess decision with limited
success.' 5 On a second front, states also have lobbied Congress to use

9. See ACIR REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-12.
10. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
11. 386 U.S. 754 (1967).
12. This figure was estimated to be between $1.4 and $1.5 billion in 1985. ACIR REPORT,
supra note 4, at 11. At a recent symposium, this number was alleged to be as high as $2.4
billion annually. See Douglas, Campaign to Tax Interstate Mail Order Sales, 47 TAx NOTES
(TAx ANALYSTS) 1048, 1049 (1990) (reporting on recent symposium on state efforts to collect
sales tax on interstate sales).
13. Id. See generally Hearings on H.R. 1242 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 151-57 (1988)
(statement of William T. End, Executive Vice-President, L.L. Bean, Inc., on proposed federal
legislation concerning collection of sales and use taxes on interstate sales).
14. ACIR REPORT, supra note 4, at 11, 23.
15. See Douglas, supra note 12, at 1049 (reporting that success on this front has been
limited).
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its commerce clause powers to repeal or modify the decision.16 This
course of action, however, has been completely unsuccessful. 17 Undaunted by these failures, states recently have begun to amend their
use tax provisions to address the jurisdictional problem associated
with interstate mail order purchases. This emerging legislation generally utilizes, in one form or another, an economic presence or nexus '8
theory as the state's jurisdictional basis for compelling out-of-state
mail order vendors to collect the use tax on interstate sales. As this
article will show, this new version of nexus is constitutionally suspect.
This article will address the theory of economic presence or nexus
as it relates to the constitutional limitations set forth in National
Bellas Hess and other cases, mainly use tax cases, that have addressed
the nexus requirement under the commerce and due process clauses
of the federal Constitution. In light of such limitations, this article
specifically will examine two major types of emerging state use tax
collection legislation relating to out-of-state mail order vendors and
other direct marketers.19 This article concludes that the economic presence or nexus theory, when used as the sole basis for a state's taxing
jurisdiction, is unconstitutional as applied to pure mail order vendors

16. Opponents of federal legislation (i.e., the mail order industry) argue that despite its
commerce clause powers, Congress may not alter the holding in National Bellas Hess because
the court decided the case on constitutionally protected due process grounds over which Congress
lacks the power to legislate. ACIR REPORT, supra note 4, at 9. Proponents argue that Congress
nonetheless possesses the power to legislate in areas protected by the due process clause, as
it has proven in other areas of law. See, e.g., Hellerstein, Significant Sales and Use Tax
Developments During the Past Half Century, 39 VAND. L. REV. 961, 983-92 (1986); Hartman,
Collection of the Use Tax on Out-Of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39 VAND. L. REx'. 993, 1021-31
(1986).
17. As of the time of this article's writing, Congress had not yet passed any legislation
that enabled states to compel out-of-state vendors to collect sales or use taxes on interstate sales.
18. For purposes of this article, the term "economic presence or nexus" means a vendor's
contacts with a taxing state through non-physical means; for example, telecommunications or
advertising.
19. The issues and analyses discussed in this article pertain not only to those engaged in
the mail order industry, but to any business engaged in direct marketing (i.e., selling operations
which do not depend on a physical display of their goods). The main focus of this article,
however, is the mail order industry.
For purposes of this article the terms "out-of-state mail order vendor" and "direct marketer"
denote one engaged in only interstate sales. See supra note 6 (discussing this article's use of
the term "interstate sale"). The term "mail order vendor" encompasses only those entities
engaging in the traditional mail order business (i.e., L.L. Bean, Inc.; Spiegel, Inc.). The term
"direct marketer" refers to vendors that use telecommunications as the primary medium to
either advertise or solicit orders (i.e., home shopping networks).
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and other pure direct marketers. First, however, this article will provide a historical overview of the nexus concept as it applies to the
constitutionality of state-imposed use tax collection duties.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Commerce and Due Process Clauses

The commerce clause provides that Congress shall have the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States . . . . "20 Even when Congress has not acted affirmatively to
protect interstate commerce, the commerce clause prevents the states

from discriminating against interstate commerce. 21 The current ap-

proach to determine whether a state tax violates the commerce clause
is illustrated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 2 A state tax2'
will be sustained against commerce clause objections if "the tax is

applied to an activity with a substantialnexus with the taxing State,
is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." 24
This article will address only the first prong of the Complete Auto
test - the nexus requirement.
The due process clause provides that no state shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.25 With

20. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
21. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 29 (1988).
22. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The Court in Complete Auto rejected the notion that state taxation
of interstate commerce was unconstitutional per se. Id. at 289 (overruling Spector Motor Service,
Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1981)); see D.H. Holmes Co., 486 U.S. at 30.
23. Use tax collection duties are a form of state taxation. See infra note 25.
24. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added).
25. U.S CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A tax is an involuntary exaction of property used for
the good of the general public. See, e.g., United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 586, 572 (1931)
(defining a 'tax" as an "enforced contribution to provide support of government"); Wisconsin
v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 443- (1940) ("A tax is an exaction."), rehg denied, 312 U.S.
712 (1941). Although states generally impose liability on vendors for collected or uncollected
use taxes, the imposition of use tax collection duties by a state is treated as a tax of the imposing
state. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 ('The practical and legal effect of
the Maryland [use tax] statute as it has been applied to this Delaware vendor is to make the
vendor liable for a use tax from the purchaser. In economic consequence, it is identical with
making him pay a sales tax."), reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 964 (1954).
Although it has never expressly stated its analytical framework, the United States Supreme
Court has consistently analyzed a state-imposed duty to collect use taxes as a tax on the vendor.
See infra notes 33-91 and accompanying text. The Court's position in this area is consistent
with its general approach in analyzing the legal incidence of a state tax: it looks to the tax's
practical effect. See, e.g., Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344. Ostensibly, the Court has treated the
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regard to state taxation, substantive due process requires as a
threshold matter that the taxpayer have certain minimum contacts
which establish a nexus with the taxing state. 26 The Supreme Court
has stated that the controlling question is "whether the [taxing] state
has given anything for which it can ask return."- Thus, due process
generally boils down to an issue of fairness.The nexus requirements under the commerce and due process
clauses are similar. 29 In cases involving state sales taxation, the Supreme Court treats both commerce and due process as part of one
general inquiry. 39 Under the due process clause, however, no requirement exists that the amount of revenue collected from a state tax be
reasonably related to the services provided by the taxing state.3 1 Thus,
due process does not include a requirement analogous to the fourth
32
prong of the Complete Auto test.

vendor as subject to tax because state use tax provisions generally imposed liability on the
vendor for uncollected use taxes. See National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 n.9. The costs of
complying with a state's use tax provisions also are an involuntary exaction on the vendor,
albeit indirect. In both ways, the vendor incurs an involuntary cost (i.e., an involuntary exaction
of property for the benefit of the general public of the taxing state).
26. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also infra
text accompanying note 67 (quoting Miller Bros.).
27. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940), reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1941).
28. See InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (due process requires a sufficient nexus so that
state action "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " (citations
omitted)); see also Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 345 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment makes one a
citizen of the state wherein he resides[;] the fact of residence creates universally reciprocal
duties of protection by the state and of allegiance and support by the citizen. The latter obviously
includes a duty to pay tax .... ").
29. Compare supra text accompanying note 24 (illustrating the four prongs test in Complete
Auto) with text accompanying supra note 26 and infra note 67 (illustrating two articulations
of the due process test).
30. See National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). Even though National Bellas Hess
was decided before Complete Auto, the Court continues to adhere to this combined analysis.
See generally National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 631 (1977)
(discussed infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text). This article will generally adhere to the
Court's amalgamated approach and address the nexus requirement under commerce and due
process clause as basically the same inquiry. It will, however, point out policy differences where
pertinent. For a comprehensive discussion of the Court's combined approach in state tax cases,
see generally Nagel, The Emergence of a Single Nexus Standard, 45 TAx NOTES (TAX
ANALYSTS) 327 (1989) (discussing the nexus standard as a means of testing the constitutionality
of state taxes).
31. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622, reh'g denied. 453 U.S. 927
(1981).
32. See supra text accompanying note 24 (illustrating the four prong test in Complete Auto).
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B.

The Nexus Requirement and Use Tax Collection

In 1939 the United States Supreme Court decided Felt & Tarrant
Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher.3 The decision fairly represents the
Court's early approach to analyzing the constitutionality of state use
tax collection duties imposed on out-of-state vendors.3 In this case,
the Supreme Court analyzed a California statute which required any
retailer who maintained an in-state place of business to collect a use
tax on all sales of personal property made for use or consumption
within the state.3 The vendor, an Illinois corporation, entered into
an exclusive agency agreement with two California-based "general"
agents giving them the exclusive right to solicit in-state orders. 36 The
agreement required the vendor to pay the rent for the agents' offices
and reimburse them for authorized travel expenses.3 7 The vendor never
qualified to "do business" in California under its statutes.38
The vendor objected on commerce clause and due process grounds
with having to comply with California's use tax provisions. 39 The vendor contended that its California business was wholly interstate and,
therefore, not subject to California's jurisdiction. 40 The Court held for
the state on the basis that the tax was imposed at a time when the
goods had "come to rest" in California, and was levied on the ultimate
purchaser and not on the seller. 41 In so holding, the Court found "no
unconstitutional burden either upon interstate commerce or upon the
[vendor]. '4 2 Although the opinion did not specifically address the nexus
issue, Felt & Tarrant nonetheless illustrates a common factual basis
that the Court has used in its later cases to find a sufficient nexus:
the physical presence derived from agents or real property holdings
within the taxing state.
Physical presence, however, did expressly form the foundation for
nexus in the Court's next major decision in the use tax area, and the
first one that involved mail order sales. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck &

33.

306 U.S. 62 (1939).

34.

For other examples of this approach, see Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86

(1934); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
35. Felt & Tarrant, 306 U.S. at 62.
36. Id. at 64.

37. Id. at 64-65.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.

41.

Id. at 67-68.

42.

Id. at 68 (quoting Monamotor Oil, 292 U.S. at 95).
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Co.43 involved an Iowa use tax provision that imposed a use tax on
personal property used or consumed in Iowa and imposed an obligation
on the seller to collect the tax.44 Sears, a New York corporation, was
licensed to "do business" as a foreign corporation in Iowa and maintained local retail stores throughout the state.4 5 Sears also maintained
several out-of-state mail order facilities, which it operated as separate
divisions. Iowa customers could place mail orders to Sears' out-of-state
locations either through the local stores or directly with the out-ofstate locations. While Sears collected the tax on mail orders placed
with its Iowa-based stores, it refused to do so with respect to those
orders placed directly with its out-of-state locations.46
In support of its refusal, Sears raised both commerce and due
process clause arguments. 47 Sears contended that direct out-of-state
sales were unrelated to its local activity because those sales lacked a
sufficient nexus with Iowa.41 In rejecting this argument, the Court
held that Sears could not "departmentalize" its business so as to avoid
the burden of collecting use taxes. The burden of collection was the
"price of enjoying the full benefits flowing from its Iowa business. ''1 9
In the commerce clause argument, Sears asserted that its compliance
would subject it to administrative costs that its competitors in the
mail order industry would not incur.- The Court similarly rejected
this contention.51

43. 312 U.S. 359, reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 715 (1941).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 361-62.
46. Id. at 362.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 364.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 365.
51. Id. The Court reasoned that Sears was "doing business" in Iowa as a foreign corporation
while its competitors in the mail order industry were not. Therefore, Sears was receiving
benefits from Iowa that its competitors were not. These additional benefits allowed Iowa to
properly impose use tax collection duties on Sears' out-of-state sales. Id.
On the same day, the Court decided Nelson v. Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373, reh'g
denied, 312 U.S. 716 (1941). This case also involved Iowa's use tax, and its facts were virtually
the same as those in Sears, Roebuck. Montgomery Ward, a foreign corporation operating retail
stores nationally and licensed to "do business" as such in Iowa, operated 29 retail stores and
several order offices in the state. 312 U.S. at 373-74. Like Sears, Montgomery Ward collected
Iowa tax on sales made at its Iowa stores and those handled by its Iowa order centers, but
refused to collect any tax on orders that Iowa residents sent directly to its out-of-state mall
order houses. Id. Mail orders subsequently were delivered via United States mail or common
carrier. Id. Montgomery Ward raised the same constitutional objections to collecting Iowa use
tax as did Sears. Id. at 375. It too attempted to distance its mail order operations from its local

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss4/6
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The cases of Sears, Roebuck and Nelson v. Montgomery Wardclearly indicated the Court's expanding view of taxing jurisdiction and
the Court's willingness to reduce the level of contact with the taxing
state necessary to constitute a sufficient nexus for use tax collection
purposes. Both cases involved foreign corporations qualified to "do
business" in the taxing state. The Court held in those cases that a
foreign corporation could not avoid the ostensible quid pro quo of
having the privilegeO to do business within the state merely by departmentalizing or isolating separate divisions of their operations.
In both of these cases, the vendors maintained premises within
the state. Physical presence allowed Iowa constitutionally to impose
use tax collection duties with respect to all other business that a
vendor transacted within the state. As will be illustrated later, there
presently is no constitutional requirement that all business giving rise
to use tax liability be related - in the sense of the same line of
business - to the business that gave rise to the sufficient contacts
with the state.54 But one must not jump too quickly in applying a
force-of-attraction principle: to do so would risk putting the cart before
the horse. In Sears, Roebuck and Montgomery Ward, the Court first
found the sufficient level of contacts based on the corporations' physical
presence within the state. Upon this constitutionally sufficient basis,
the Court then applied a force-of-attraction principle to the vendors'
other economic presence with the state (i.e., the vendor's mail order
business). Physical presence was the condition precedent that allowed
the taxing state to compel the vendors to collect use taxes arising
from all of their mail order business within the state.
A subsequent case further illustrating the Court's then expanding
view of nexus is General Trading Co. v. Tax Commission.- Again,
Iowa's use tax collection provisions were at issue. This time, however,
the vendor, a foreign corporation, had never qualified to "do business"
in Iowa nor had the vendor ever maintained any permanent offices in
the state.6 The vendor's nexus consisted of traveling salesmen, who

Iowa-based retail activities and argued an insufficient nexus with respect to direct mail order
sales. Id. Relying on its decision in Sears, Roebuck, the Court similarly upheld the duty to
collect Iowa use tax on out-of-state mail order sales. Id. at 375-76.
52. 312 U.S. 373, reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 716 (1941) (for a discussion of the case, see supra
note 51).
53. See supra text accompanying note 27.
54. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text (discussing the more recent decision of
National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977)).
55. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
56. Id. at 337.
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merely solicited orders from within the state.5 7 Against the vendor's
due process contention, the Court upheld the use tax collection duties
imposed by the state., The Court held that the employees' presence
within the state provided the requisite contacts with the taxing state,
even though the employees did not permanently reside in Iowa. More
importantly, physical nexus or presence again formed the basis for
jurisdiction, not the vendor's economic presence.
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Miller
Brothers Co. v. Maryland.5 9 Here the vendor was a Delaware corporation conducting a furniture retail business which was physically located in Delaware.- The vendor took no orders by mail or by telephone, but Maryland residents did make on-site purchases from its
Delaware location.61 Purchases by Maryland residents were regularly
delivered in Maryland through common carriers or the vendor's
trucks.,3'-'
Maryland law required vendors to collect use taxes on all personal
property used or consumed in Maryland, but the vendor in Miller
Brothers refused.- On one occasion, Maryland seized one of the vendor's trucks while it was on route in Maryland.64 The vendor raised
a due process defense to the confiscation.6 The dispositive issue in
the case involved the sufficiency of the vendor's nexus with Maryland.
In disposing of the nexus issue, the Court stated the following
oft-quoted principle: "due process requires some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or

57. Id.
58. Id. at 337-38. According to the Court, it was willing to go as far as Felt & Tarrant in
which more "elaborate arrangements for soliciting orders" were used. Id. at 3:38. The Court
went on to say, in dicta, that
the fact that in the Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward cases the interstate
vendor also had retail stores in Iowa . . . is constitutionally irrelevant to the right
of Iowa sustained in those cases to exact a use tax from purchasers on mail order
goods forwarded into Iowa from without the State. All these differentiations are
without constitutional significance.
Id. While this language implied that all that was needed was economic presence, the Court has
never gone so far in subsequent cases. In fact, the Court has scaled back its view of taxing
jurisdiction in subsequent use tax cases. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
59. 347 U.S. 340, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 964 (1954).
60. Id. at 341.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 344.
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785

transaction it seeks to tax. '" 7 The Court distinguished Miller Brothers
from General Trading Co. on the basis of the extent of contacts with
the taxing state.r The Court held for the vendor in Miller Brothers
on due process grounds.
To the extent Miller Brothers concerns the types of contacts that
constitute a sufficient nexus, the case is important with respect to
out-of-state mail order vendors. First, the vendor in Miller Brothers
had continuous physical contact with the taxing state when the vendor's trucks or the trucks of its common carrier agents used the taxing
state's roadways, but this was not enough.69 Second, the vendor evidently had some economic presence in Maryland in the form of general
newspaper advertising and direct mailings. 70 Yet, the majority of the
Court found these contacts insufficient, either alone or in conjunction
with other physical contacts. The Court reaffirmed its view that before
a force-of-attraction principle can be applied to a vendor's economic

presence, a sufficient physical nexus with the taxing state must be
71

shown .

In 1960, the Court in Scripto, Inc. v. Carsono had little trouble
holding that the requisite "definite link" was present. In Scripto, a

67. Id. at 344-45.
68. In General Trading Co., the out-of-state vendor conducted "continuous local solicitation
followed by delivery of ordered goods to the customers, the only nonlocal phase of the total
sale being acceptance of the order." Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 346. But, the Court continued,
"there is a wide gulf between this type of active and aggressive operation within a taxing state
and [as in the case of Miller Bros.] the occasional delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store
with no solicitationother than the incidentaleffects of general advertising."Id. at 347 (emphasis
added).
69. This also clearly showed the Court's unwillingness to expand its view of taxing jurisdiction as far as the dicta in General TradingCo. might have suggested. See supra note 46 (quoting
dicta in General Trading Co.).
70. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 349 n.4. Maryland in fact used the vendor's economic presence
as two grounds for obligating the vendor to collect use tax: "(1) the vendor's advertising with
Delaware papers and radio stations, though not especially directed to Maryland inhabitants,
reached, and was known to reach, their notice; (2) its occasional sales circulars mailed to all
former customers included customers in Maryland." Id. at 341-42. And the dissent rather emphatically stated:
This is not a case of a minimal contact between a vendor and the collecting state.
[The vendor] did not sell cash-and-carry without knowledge of the destination of
the goods; and its delivery truck was not in Maryland upon a casual, non-recurring
visit. Rather there has been a course of conduct in which [the vendor] has regularly
injected advertising into media reaching Maryland consumers....
Id. at 358 (Warren, C.J., Douglas, Black,_& Clark, JJ., dissenting).
71. Id. at 347.
72. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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separate division of a Georgia corporation used nonemployee agents
to solicit orders in Florida. The Court held that the agents' activities
constituted "continuous local solicitation" in such a manner that the
"only [nonlocal] incidence of this sales transaction ... [was] the acceptance of the order." Scripto was simply a post-Miller Brothers extension of the constitutional principles previously espoused in General
Trading Co. While General Trading Co. involved employees who solicited orders on behalf' of the vendor,7 Scripto involved independent
75
agents who resided in the taxing state.
In 1967, the Supreme Court finally addressed the situation of a
pure mail order vendor in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department
of Revenue. 76 In this case, the vendor's nexus with the taxing state
consisted of a semi-annual national catalog mailing to the vendor's
recent customers in Illinois, and the subsequent delivery of ordered
merchandise to the Illinois customers via United States mail or common carrier. 77 The customers ordered all of the merchandise from the
vendor by mail. The vendor accepted all of the orders at its out-of-state
location.
In holding that the vendor's contacts with the state were constitutionally deficient, the Court refused to withdraw from the "sharp
distinction[s]" that it had previously drawn between mail order vendors
"with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a state, and vendors
who do no more than communicate with customers in the state by
mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business." 781
The Court went on to support its decision further in favor of the
79
vendor on the basis of undue compliance burdens.
The most recent decision in which the United States Supreme
Court addressed use tax collection duties imposed on an out-of-state
mail order vendor was National Geographic Society v. California
Board of Equalization. ° The vendor, National Geographic, a nonprofit
corporation of the District of Columbia, maintained two offices in
California from which it solicited advertising for its National Geographic magazine.81 The vendor also operated a mail order business

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 211.
See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
362 U.S. at 208-09.
386 U.S. 753 (1967).
Id. at 754-55.
Id. at 758.
See infra text accompanying note 130 (quoting NationalBellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60).
430 U.S. 551 (1977).
Id. at 552.
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that sold various educational merchandise from its facilities in the
District of Columbia and Maryland. A]l mail orders were shipped
from the out-of-state facilities and delivered through the United States
mail . 8 California sought to require the vendor to collect the use tax
due from the mail order sales of educational merchandise to California
residents. 4 The vendor raised a due process clause defense alleging
5
its nexus with California was constitutionally deficient.
The vendor claimed that the nexus test was two-pronged: not only
must a sufficient nexus exist between the vendor and the taxing state,
but additionally a sufficient nexus must exist between the specific
activity to be taxed and the vendor's activity within the state. 6 The
Court rejected this contention and stated that its prior decisions required only " 'some definite link, some minimum connection between
[the State and] the person ...

the state seeks to tax.'

"

The Court

had no trouble finding that the physical presence of the vendor's advertising offices in California provided the requisite nexus.88
On the facts, National Geographic appears to be little more than
an extension of the Sears, Roebuck and Montgomery Ward cases. The
real significance of the case, at least as it bears on the nexus requirement, is found in the Court's express disapproval of the "slightest
presence" nexus test89 articulated by the California Supreme Court.9
Despite upholding the decision of the California court, the United
States Supreme Court clearly stated that the vendor's contacts with

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 552-53.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 561 (quoting Miller Bros, 347 U.S. at 34445) (emphasis added by Court).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 555-56. The California Supreme Court stated:
We are satisfied that from [prior U.S. Supreme Court] decisions the following
principle can be distilled and we thus hold: Where an out-of-state seller conducts
a substantial mail order business with residents of a state imposing a use tax on
such purchasers and the seller's connection with the taxing state is not exclusively
by means of the instruments of interstate commerce, the slightest presence within
such taxing state independent of any connection through interstate commerce will
permit the state constitutionally to impose on the seller the duty of collecting the
use tax from such mail order purchasers and the liability for failure to do so.
Id. at 555-56 (quoting National Geographic, 16 Cal. 3d 637, 644, 128 Cal. Rptr. 682, 686, 547
P.2d 458, 462 (1976) (emphasis added by Court)).
90. Id. at 556.
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California were sufficient because they "establish[ed] a much more
substantial presence than the expression 'slightest presence' connotes. "9'
III.

NEW TYPES OF STATE USE TAX COLLECTION PROVISIONS

One new type of state use tax collection legislation directed at
out-of-state mail order vendors is derived, in large part, from the
language in Scripto.9" In Scripto, the Court distinguished Miller
Brothers,93 stating that "there was no 'exploitation of the consumer
market'; no regular, systematic displaying of its products by catalogs,
samples or the like." Some states have used this language to create
a mountain out of a molehill. These states have attempted to legislate
a constitutionally sufficient nexus for the purpose of collecting use
taxes when an out-of--state vendor systematically advertises in the
state, systematically sends its catalogs to state residents through the
United States mail, or provides an "800" telephone service to the
residents of the state. North Carolina's amended use tax provisions
provide an excellent example of this version of the economic presence
theory: the communicative nexus.
In general, North Carolina requires every retailer who engages in
business within the state to collect use taxes regardless of the place
where the sale is consummated.95 This provision goes on to state:
A retailer who makes a mail order sale is engaged in business in [North Carolina] and is subject to the tax levied
under this Article if one of the following conditions is met:
(5) The retailer, by purposefully or systematically
exploiting the market in the State by media-assisted, mediafacilitated, or media-solicited means, including direct mail
advertising, distribution of catalogs, computer-assisted shopping, television, radio or other electronic media, telephone
or other
solicitation, magazine or newspaper advertisements,
96
media, creates nexus with this State.

91.

Id.

92. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
94. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8 (1989).
96. Id. at (b)(5) (emphasis added). For other examples of similar legislation, see ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1401(5)(b) (Supp. 1989) (defining the term "retailer"); ARK. STAT. ANN.

§§ 26-53-102(4) (1987) (defining the term "vendor") & 26-53-121(b) (Supp. 1989) (requiring certain
out-of-state vendors to file with the state for purposes of use tax collection); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 12-407(12) (West Supp. 1990) (defining the term "retailer") & (15) (West Supp. 1990)
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(defining the phrase "engaged in business"); FLA. STAT. §§ 212.0596(1) (1989) (defining a "sale
of tangible personal property" as including mail order purchases) & 212.06(2)(g) (1989) (defining
the term "dealer"); IDAHO CODE § 63-3611(e), (f), (g) & Qj)(1989) (defining the phrase "retailer
engaged in business"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, para. 439.2(2), (3) & (4) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990) (defining the phrase "retailer maintaining a place of business in this state"); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 79-3702(h)(2) (1989) (defining the phrase "retailer engaged in business in this state);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.340(2) (Baldwin 1989) (defining the phrase "retailer engaged in
business in this state"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 64H, § 1(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (sales
tax provision defining the phrase "engaged in business in the commonwealth") & ch. 641, § 1(1)
(Law Co-op. 1986) (use tax provision citing the definition of the phrase "engaged in business
in the commonwealth" used in ch. 64H, § 1(5)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.21, subdiv. 4(a)(1),
(2), (3), (5), (6), (7) & (8) (West Supp. 1990) (requiring registration of and compelling use tax
collection duties on out-of-state retailers not maintaining an in-state place of business and meeting
certain statutory criteria; enumerating such criteria); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 27-67-3(j) (Supp.
1989) (defining the phrase "person doing business in this state" to include those making mall
order sales) & 27-67-4(2)(e) (Supp. 1989) (imposing use tax collection duties on mail order vendors
and having a communicative nexus -vith the state) & 27-67-4(1) (Supp. 1989) (defining the term
'mail order sales"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2702(12) (1986 & Supp. 1988) (defining the term
"retailer") & 21(e), (f) (Supp. 1988) (defining the phrase "engaged in business"); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 372.360(2) (Michie 1986) (requiring the filing of use tax returns by "each retailer
maintaining a place of business in this state") & 372.728(4), (5), (6) & (9) (Supp. 1989) (defining
the phrase "retailer maintaining a place of business in this state"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-2(i)
(West 1986 & West Supp. 1989) (defining the term "vendor"); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(C)
& (E) (Consol. Supp. 1989) (defining the term "vendor"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6)
(Supp. 1989) (defining the term "retailer") & (7) (Supp. 1989) (defining the phrase "retailer
maintaining a place of business in this state"); S.B. No. 303, 118th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.,
1990 Ohio Laws _
(amending the definition of the phrase "nexus with this state"), to be
codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5741.01(H)(3) & (6); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1354.5
(West Supp. 1990) (collection of sales or use tax imposed on certain out-of-state vendors); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-35-95 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (defining the term "nonresident retailer");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(6)(J) (1989) (defining the term "dealer"); TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.107(a)(4), (5) & (6) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (defining the phrase "retailer engaged in business
in this state"); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 82.12.040(1) (Supp. 1990) (imposing use tax collection
duties on "every person who maintains in this state a place of business"); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 458-20-193B (19L ) (interpreting the preceding statute to encompass certain out-of-state mail
order vendors); W. VA. CODE § 11-15A-6a(a)(1), (2), (3) & (5) (Supp. 1989) (imposing use tax
collection duties on "certain other [i.e., out-of-state] retailers"). See also IOWA CODE ANN. §
422.43(12)(a) & (b) (West 1990) (imposing a gross receipts tax on certain retailers); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, §§ 1354.2 (West Supp. 1990) (imposing a gross receipts tax on certain out-of-state
vendor) & 1354.3 (West Supp. 1990) (same).
For older state statutory provisions that either specifically address, or appear written to
indirectly encompass, mail order vendors, and use tax collections duties, see Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 144.605(11) (Vernon 1976) (defining the term "vendor"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-10(A) (1978)
(establishing use tax collection agents); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7201(b)(3) (Purdon Supp.
1990) (defining the term "maintaining a place of business in this Commonwealth"); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 44-18-24(a) (1988) (defining the phrase "engaging in business") & 44-18-24(a) (1988)
(pertaining to use tax collection by retailers on interstate sales); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
9701(9) (1981) (defining the term "vendor"); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612(C)(3) (1984) (use tax
collection provision setting forth conditions under which a dealer "shall be deemed" to have
sufficient nexus with the state in order to compel a dealer's registration).
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North Carolina and other states that have adopted similar provisions which create a statutorily sufficient nexus with the state through
communicative means alone have grossly misconstrued the language
from Scripto and similar cases. Without an accompanying physical
presence in the taxing state - constitutionally sufficient in itself the Court never has held that this type of economic presence alone
is sufficient to establish nexus. In Scripto, the vendor's agents provided the requisite nexus with the taxing state through their physical
presence in the state.Y Also, physical presence was the basis upon
which jurisdiction was found in Scripto's progenitor, General Trading
Co.98 The agents in Scripto used the vendor's catalogs, samples, and
advertising material in connection with their solicitations within the
state.- The vendor, however, did not communicate directly with residents of the state. Moreover, one need only look to National Bellas
Hess and Miller Brothers as additional support for the unconstitutionality of using communications to form the sole basis for nexus.
The vendor in National Bellas Hess systematically sent catalogs
to residents of the state: definitely an advertising campaign directed
toward the taxing state.Y°° Who can question seriously whether these
actions were purposeful? Yet, the Court held that such contacts suffered from a constitutional infirmity.1 In Miller Brothers, the vendor
used newspapers to advertise its wares. 10 2 The newspaper, although
Delaware-based, had a significant Maryland circulation. 10- Yet, the
Court again found that the contacts were insufficient.04 As far as
contacts are concerned, telecommunications are no different in substance than use of the United States mail. Therefore, use of the United
States mail in combination with other communicative contacts does
not create a constitutionally sufficient nexus. 0 5
The Court's recent decision in Golberg v. Sweet06 provides the
latest evidence that communicative nexus alone is insufficient to pro-

97. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
98. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing General Trading Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944)).
99. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 209.
100. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754-55. See also supra text accompanying notes
77-78 (discussing the facts of the case).
101. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60.
102. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 70.
104. See supra text accompanying note 71.
105. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing National Bellas Hess).
106. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
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vide the requisite nexus. In deciding whether a state tax on interstate
telecommunications violated the commerce clause,17 the Court expressed doubts "that termination of an interstate telephone call, by
itself," provides a sufficient nexus for a state to tax a telephone call. 1 8
The Court held that the only states possessing a sufficient nexus to
tax the call are those states in which the caller maintained some
physical presence. 109 Thus, vendors who "do no more than communicate
with customers" of the taxing state are constitutionally protected from
110
use tax collection duties.

In order to support the constitutionality of emerging legislation,
commentators and state officials have dismissed the continued vitality
of National.Bellas Hess,"' as well as the soundness of the case's

107. Id. at 254. Illinois, the taxing state, imposes a 5% tax on the gross charge of interstate
telecommunications either originating or terminating in Illinois and charged to an Illinois service
address, regardless where the telephone call is billed or paid. Id. at 256.
108. Id. at 263 (citing National Bellas Hess). The Court also expressed doubts whether
those "states through which a telephone call's electronic signals merely pass have a sufficient
nexus to tax the call." Id. (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 631 (1973)).
109. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 263.
110. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
111. Letter from Joanne Limbach, Ohio Tax Commissioner, to Daniel T. White (Apr. 24,
1990) ("Like most other state officials, we seriously doubt the continued viability of National
Bellas Hess."); Douglas, supra note 12, at 1048 ('"The second approach [to taxing mail order
sales], taken by North Dakota, is to say that Bellas Hess is no longer good law . . . ."); see
also Hartman, supra note 15, at 1006-08 (discussing the significant growth and the chronological
advances in the mail order business in the 20 years following NationalBellas Hess); see generally
McCray, OverturningBellas Hess: Due Process Consideration,1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 265 (questioning the validity of National Bellas Hess under modern due process analysis). Nevertheless,
the United States Supreme Court has never so much as implied to the contrary, and has in
fact recently cited the case in two major state tax decisions. See D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara,
486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988); Golberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989).
National Bellas Hess has also been criticized as outdated from a technological perspective
in that modern technological advances in communications have changed the way that a business
operates since 1967, the year of the decision. See Hartman, supra note 15, at 1007; Douglas,
supra note 12, at 1048; see generally McCray, supra (discussing growth potential carried by
new electronic marketing technology). But one must not forget that economic contacts analogous
to those currently available with today's technology were present in 1967, and in fact involved
in the case. The telephone was common to both eras, as was the United States Postal Service.
Moreover, a "collect" telephone call is analogous to today's "800" telephone number. The only
difference between today's telecommunication technology and that which was available in 1967
seems to be the quality of the above products and services, which has undoubtedly led to today's
increased use of telecommunications.
The argument above therefore begs the question. How can the mere use of technological
advances by an industry - the mail order industry, in particular - make a state's exertion of
its taxing powers over the users of such technology more fair today? Technological advances
have made it possible for certain members of certain industries to lower their costs of doing
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premises. With respect to the latter, commentators have argued that
requiring a few "warm bodies" in the taxing jurisdiction, "either
operating from an office, or traipsing around hawking their wares
without any in-state office" (i.e., physical nexus), are less meaningful
as a condition precedent for proper jurisdiction than more substantial
economic contacts. 112 In theory, this proposition might be appropriate
under the due process clause because any form of purposeful contacts
arising from an attempt to exploit a state's economy, arguably, does
not offend notions of "fair play. ''"1 However, the level of a vendor's
communicative contacts with the taxing state must constitute a "sub' 4 within the
stantial presence""
state, since the "slightest presence"
5
will not suffice."
Moreover, being subject to taxation is quite different from being
brought before a court of law: much, much more is at stake. The
out-of-state vendor is forced to incur annual compliance costs, and
becomes subject to use tax related penalties (i.e., failure to file state-

business. Modern graphic arts, telecommunications, and an arguably more efficient United States
Postal Service have made local display of wares no longer necessary in many instances. In
reality this argument boils down to the realization that locally-situated traditional sources of
tax revenues (i.e., physical facilities and employees), as well as historical contacts with the
taxing state upon which use tax collection duties were based, are eroding due to technological
advancement. Somehow this situation then justifies states reaching extrajurisdictionally to recoup
these losses. Preposterous. "[N]ot every out-of-state seller may constitutionally be made liable
for payment of the use tax on merchandise sold to purchasers in the [taxing] State." National
Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555 (1976).
112. Hartman, supra note 16, at 1014.
113. This notion was illustrated in Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), when
the Court stated:
Jurisdiction . . . may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not
physically enter the forum State. Although territorial presence frequently will
enhance a potential defendant's affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable
foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that
a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a
State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are
"purposefully directed" toward residents of another State, we have consistently
rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.
Id. at 476 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). But see infra note 117 (arguing that the due
process standards for state taxation and in personam jurisdiction are not the same).
114. See supra text accompanying note 24 (illustrating the four-part test of Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)).
115. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing National Geographic Soc'y,
430 U.S. at 555).
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ments or returns) and liabilities (i.e., failure to collect use tax).116 The
creation of such obligations demands a more definitive standard of
contacts; otherwise, the use tax law becomes a trap for the unwary
vendor.117 As both a fairness and a policy matter, certainty is desirable.
A desire for certainty is evident in the Supreme Court decisions
addressing the relationship between business entities and the issues
of due process and personal jurisdiction.,,8 Although the Court has
never expressly articulated certainty as an express goal of due process,
certainty, at some level, is found in the foreseeability aspect of due
process. 19 Certainty, therefore, demands that an out-of-state mail
order vendor's contacts with the taxing state be such that the vendor
can reasonably foresee being subject to the state use tax collection

116. The issue is simply not as trivial as some commentators have perceived it. See, e.g.,
McCray, supra note 111, at 293 ("When the seller is merely collecting the tax for the state,
the question becomes one of regulatory jurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
117. One commentator argued that the nexus standard under the due process clause for
state taxing jurisdiction was the same as that required for in personam jurisdiction. McCray,
supra note 111, at 287; see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945)
("The activities which establish its 'presence' subject [the vendor] alike to taxation by the state
and to suit to recover the tax."). The Court, however, has distinguished the two standards.
See Travelers' Health Assoc. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 653 (1957) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("It
is the nature of the state's action that determines the kind or degree of activity in the state
necessary for satisfying the requirements of due process."); id. at 654 (Douglas, J., concurring)
('The requirements of due process may demand more or less minimal contacts ... depending
on what the pinch of the decision is or what [a state] requires of the foreign corporation.")
(citing InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316-19).
Further evidence supporting a distinction between the two standards can be found by comparing McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and National Bellas Hess,
386 U.S. at 753. McGee involved a controversy that arose from an isolated mailing by an
out-of-state insurer, who in no manner ever solicited business in the state. McGee, 355 U.S. at
221-22. This isolated contact sufficed under the due process clause for purposes of exerting in
personam jurisdiction over the insurer. Id. at 224. If McGee were the rule in the state taxation
area, then, a fortiori, systematic mail solicitation should have sufficed in National Bellas Hess,
which was decided 10 years later. The Court, however, did not reach such a result. See supra
text accompanying notes 75-79 (discussing National Bellas Hess). Therefore, the contacts present
in InternationalShoe must have been at such a level as to satisfy the state's exercise of both
in personam and taxing jurisdiction, the latter requiring the greater amount.
118. See generally, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
(discussing due process and personal jurisdiction principles); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1979) ("the Due Process Clause... gives a degree of predictability
to the legal system").
119. Foreseeability alone, however, "has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286. "That
is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is
critical to due process ... is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. (citation omitted).
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duties. This allows the vendor prudently to arrange the business contacts with that state knowing the full ramifications of such actions.
Certainty allows businesses to plan120 and businesses which plan are
more efficient and more profitable.
With respect to mail order vendors, the bright line test of National
Bellas Hess aids in achieving certainty, and allows mail order businesses to plan. Requiring physical situs in a taxing state through either
agents or property provides mail order vendors with a clear understanding of the potential ramifications of their business arrangements.
The standard of substantial physical contacts provides a clear indication
of when a sufficient nexus with the taxing state will arise. However,
when a state requires only communicative nexus as a jurisdictional
basis for compelling the collection of use taxes, certainty begins to
erode.
Arizona law provides an example of the uncertainty that can arise
in the economic presence theory when the communicative nexus version is used. Under Arizona law, a "retailer" must collect use taxes.
The law further defines "retailer" to include, inter alia, "a person
who solicits orders for tangible personal property by mail if solicitations are substantial and recurring.' 12' The obvious question arises:
How many catalogs must be sent to Arizona residents in order to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of "substantial presence?"' Idaho law provides another example of this type of constitutional
uncertainty. Idaho law requires all retailers "engaged in business in
this state" and making sales of nonexempt tangible personal property
to collect use tax from purchasers. - A retailer is "engaged in business
in the state" if, inter alia, he solicits orders "by means of a telecommunication or television shopping system [which utilizes toll-free numbers]" broadcast to Idaho consumers. 12 However, what if a direct
marketer, using a television shopping system, contracts with a local
cable company located in a state adjacent to Idaho in order to target
the market in the other state, but the broadcast nonetheless reaches
some Idaho consumers? If some Idaho residents purchase the advertised goods from the marketer, does the Constitution allow Idaho to

120. See Nagel, supra note 30, at 334.
121. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1401(5)(b) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
122. In addition to the obvious constitutional ambiguities, the statutory requirement of
"substantial" mail solicitation itself presents the same types of ambiguities. Again, how many
catalogs must be sent to Arizona residents before the statutory requirement is met? The statute
is silent.

123.

IDAHO CODE

124.

Id. § 63-3611(e) (1989).

§ 63-3621(b) (Supp. 1990).
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compel the vendor to collect the use tax even though the marketer
could not feasibly avoid incidental contact with the Idaho viewers,
absent a choice not to advertise with the local cable company? 125 How
does the marketer know whether the communication will reach a sufficient number of Idaho consumers to make the vendor's economic
presence in Idaho constitutionally sufficient?
The examples above raise two simple, but ominous, questions: How
much communicative nexus suffices? And how does one know when
the requisite level has been reached? The list of uncertainties is endless. In the aggregate, however, they nonetheless illustrate the infeasibility of applying the economic presence theory by using the communicative nexus version as a sole basis of jurisdiction.
The policies underlying the commerce clause support the theoretical
premises of National Bellas Hess. The commerce clause prohibits
states from placing undue burdens upon interstate commerce. 126 The
commerce clause seeks to maintain the delicate balance "between the
national interest in free and open trade and the legitimate interest of
the individual states in exercising their taxing powers."' 127 Common
sense tells us that the costs of complying with the use tax provisions
of some 6,500 state and local taxing jurisdictions can be extremely
burdensome.m In National Bellas Hess, the Court addressed this
concern by stating:
[I]f the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon
[the vendor] were upheld, the resulting impediments upon

125.

According to the Court's reasoning in Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 340, the incidental

overflow of advertising should not subject the vendor to Idaho's use tax collection provisions if
it is not wide-spread. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
The Idaho example nonetheless illustrates the potential "chilling effect" that a use tax can
have on the direct marketing industry, and thus our economy. If vendors cannot afford, or

simply do not want, to risk the jurisdictional ramifications of their business arrangements with
the border states, they ostensibly must avoid all advertising in the main state to be assured of
no potential spillover in contacts. This results in a ripple effect. Not only will direct marketers
lose sales, but advertisers, broadcasters, etc. (i.e., the communications industry) will also suffer.
126. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 460 (1978); see generally
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (sales tax imposed on the privilege

of doing business in the state is not per se unconstitutional).
127. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
128. A 1986 study commissioned by the Direct Marketing Association reported that the
use tax compliance costs amounted to almost 16% of each dollar of use tax collected. TOUCHE

Ross, A STUDY

TO DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON MAIL ORDER FIRMS OF MULTI-

STATE SALES TAX COLLECTION _
(Oct. 1986) (prepared for the Direct Marketing Association), reprintedin DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC., DM.A NEXUS NOTEBOOK A-35,
A-42 (1990) (App. A).
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the free conduct of its interstate business would be neither
imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every municipality, every school district, and
every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with
power to impose sales and use taxes. The many variations
in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative
and recordkeeping requirements could entangle [the vendor's] interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated
obligations to local jurisdictions.129
The essence of the commerce clause is "to ensure a national economy
free from such unjustifiable local entanglements."13(
Commentators have suggested that computers can sufficiently
ameliorate the burdens of complying with the use tax laws of multiple
jurisdictions.13, However, computers are not the "be all and end all."
Computers still cost money. Further, computers need to be programmed and they also need an operator. The high costs are reflected by
the expensive "canned" state sales tax packages which are available. While the costs of software and hardware may not present significant
obstacles to the larger mail order houses,- they certainly are significant to the smaller emerging companies m - those upon which our
economy grows more dependent each day.
Proponents of federal enabling legislation concede that small
businesses would be unduly burdened by multiple state compliance.'These proponents, therefore, uniformly agree that enabling legislation
should include a de minimis exemption for small mail order houses.w

129. National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967).
130. Id. at 760.
131. Hartman, supra note 16, at 1011. See also Westphal, The Computer'sRole in Simplifying Compliance with State and Local Taxation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1097 (1986) (President of
Vertex, Inc., a leader in state and local taxation computer software, outlining his company's
product in this area).
132. See Hartman, supra note 16, at 1011-12 (letter from John R. Gregory, former head
of the Tennessee Sales and Use Tax Division). Vertex, Inc., a forerunner in developing state
and local use tax compliance software, stated that its compliance software package that covers
45 states and the District of Columbia costs approximately $12,000 initially, with a subsequent
annual maintenance fee approximating $9,500. Telephone conversation with Jeff Westphal, Vice
President, Vertex, Inc. (May 28, 1990).
133. See Hartman, supra note 16, at 1012 (letter from John R. Gregory).
134. See id. at 1011-12 (reporting that costs associated with purchasing and maintaining a
software package would be prohibitive for vendors whose annual gross sales were below

$500,000).
135.
136.

ACIR
Id.

REPORT,

supra note 4, at 87-89.
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The economic presence theory, however, in no way depends upon a
company's net worth or net sales. Therefore, the judicial adoption of
any version of the economic presence theory will burden unduly the
smaller members of the mail order industry, who by anyone's definition
comprise a surprisingly high proportion of the industry's membership
and sales.' The judiciary cannot fashion a fair remedy that satisfies
the requirements of the commerce clause by painting with a broad
brush. Fairness demands an exemption for the small mail order vendors. 138 But experts and Congress alike cannot agree on exactly what
constitutes a "small" mail order vendor.?3 This enigma illustrates the
sensitive political considerations inherent in the economic presence
theory. Congress, not the judiciary, is best suited to weigh these

political considerations.140
Assuming, arguendo, that the costs of computer hardware and
software are not too burdensome to any vendor, another costly compliance issue potentially may exist. Computer software packages deal
mainly with the differing use tax rates, forms, and filing dates of the
numerous taxing jurisdictions.'14 However, these software packages
do not address the possible exemptions from sales and use tax.

Two general categories of exemptions exist with respect to state
sales and use tax law: exempt purchasers and exempt goods. 142 Exactly
who is exempt or what goods are exempt varies greatly from state

to state., 3 States uniformly require that vendors obtain exemption
137. See id. at 89.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
139. See ACIR REPORT, supra note 4, at 87-89.
140. Cf. cases involving the political question doctrine, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1985) (foreign relations); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)
(immigration); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1969) (comprehensive analysis of the political question
doctrine). In Japan Whaling, the court explained:
The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies
which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive
Branch. The judiciary is particularly ill-suited to make such decisions, as "courts
are fundamentally underequipped to formulate national policies. .. ."
Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230 (footnote omitted) (quoting with approval United States ex
rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 999 (1982)).
141. Westphal, supra, note 131, at 1097.
142. See State Tax Guide (P-H) 1 5225 (1990). A third category, specific transactions, exists
also.
143. Many mail order vendors "sell clothing and gifts, and the treatment of items in these
categories varies widely from state to state. Every set of exemptions is a different maze of
complexities." Levering, An Examination of the Merits of FederalLegislationto Require Out-ofState Mail Order Companies to Collect State Use Taxes, 4 N.Y.U. INST. ON ST. AND LOCAL
TAX'N § 8.03[1] (1986).
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certificates from purchasers claiming to be exempt from sales and use
tax, lest they risk paying the uncollected use tax themselves. - Therefore, vendors must decide between incurring additional compliance
costs or risking the possibility of paying the tax due from those claiming to be exempt.
Ascertaining who or what is exempt demands a great deal of time
and expense; 4 5 even more so to those vendors who must rely on
outside legal counsel. In addition, computers may not sufficiently
ameliorate compliance difficulties involving exemptions.146 Such hidden
147
costs again hit small businesses the hardest.
A second type of emerging state use tax legislation centers around
the contacts of in-state agents and appears to use the incidental nexus
version of the economic presence theory. While the roots of this legislation can be traced to Scripto,'4 8 its innovative features ostensibly
stem from National Geographic.149 California law provides an excellent
example of this type of legislation.

144. See State Tax Guide (P-H) 5635 (1990).
145. See supra note 143.
146. Computer software programs on today's market generally do not ascertain what products or what purchasers are exempt under state law. The vendor must still manually load which
individual purchasers may be exempt (for example, due to the vendor's holding of a resale
certificate) into the software. All sales must also be manually reviewed to ascertain the status
of exempt property. One commentator has succinctly described this problem as follows:
Every [state's] set of exemptions is a different maze of complexities . . . . [T]he
exemptions for each state [must be updated] against the company's product line
. . . annually. No computer program is currently available for dealing with the
various tax bases (only rates); and, in any case, each company's product line would
have to be coded and run against a program for each state.
Levering, supra note 143, § 8.03[1].
The next generation of computer software, however, seems to be making inroads into these
particular problems. According to one of the industry's leaders, Vertex, Inc., software will soon
be available that informs the user of potential exemption areas. Telephone conversation with
Mr. Jeff Westphal, Vice President, Vertex, Inc. (Mar. 19, 1991). However, the user may still
have to manually confirm certain exempt sales or goods. Nonetheless, such software will be a
great step forward in eventually lessening compliance burdens and the complexity inherent in
multijurisdictional sales activities.
147. In addition to the compliance costs associated with tax filing (i.e., rates, dates, and
forms) and exemptions, the mail order industry contends that two other significant costs exist
with respect to collecting use taxes. They concern the lost sales from the added complexity of
communicating tax information to purchasers and the costs associated with the failures of purchasers to remit use taxes with payments for their orders. See Levering, supra note 143, §
8.03[2].
148. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 207. For a discussion of Scripto, see supra text accompanying
notes 73-74 (discussion of the case).
149. National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 631. For a discussion of National Geographic,
see supra text accompanying notes 80-91 (discussion of the case).
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In California, "every retailer engaged in business in state" and
making nonexempt sales of tangible personal property for storage,
use, or consumption in the state is obligated to collect use tax due on
such a sale from the purchaser.15 California use tax provisions also
provide:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any broadcaster, printer, outdoor advertising firm, advertising distributor, or publisher which broadcasts, publishes or displays
or distributes paid commercial advertising in this state which
is intended to be disseminated primarily to consumers located
in this state and only secondarily disseminated to. bordering
jurisdictions, including advertising appearing exclusively in
a California edition or section of a national publication, shall
be regardedfor purposes [of use tax collection] . . . as the

agent of the person or entity placing the advertisement and
that person or entity placing the advertisement shall be regarded as a "retailerengaged in business in this state."
The agency created by this part is for the sole purpose
of providing a presence in Californiafor the imposition of
a tax on out-of-state advertisers or sellers ....151

150. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6203 (West 1990). The definition of the phrase "retailer
engaged in business of this state" includes:
(d)Any retailer soliciting orders for tangible personal property by means of a
telecommunication or television shopping system (which utilizes toll free numbers)
which is intended by the retailer to be broadcast by cable television or other means
of broadcasting, to consumers located in this state[;] (e)Any retailer who, pursuant
to a contract with a broadcaster or publisher located in this state, solicits orders
for tangible personal property by means of advertising which is disseminated
primarily to consumers located in this state and only secondarily to bordering
jurisdictions[;] (f)Any retailer soliciting orders for tangible personal property by
mail if the solicitations are substantial and recurring and if the retailer benefits
from any banking, financing, debt collection, telecommunication, or marketing activities occurring in this state or benefits from the location in this state of authorized
installation, servicing, or repair facilities[;]. .. CQ)
a retailer specified in subdivision
(d), (e), () . . . is a "retailer engaged in business in this state" for the purposes
[of collecting use taxes].
Id.; see also id. § 6015 (defining the term "retailer"); infra note 148 (similar). For other states
that have recently adopted a similar statutory use tax collection provision, see NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 372.733(1) & (2)(Michie Supp. 1989) (deeming certain advertisers, broadcasters,
publishers, or printers as agents for purposes of creating a nexus with the state); 1990 Ohio
Laws __ (amending the definition of the phrase "nexus with this state"), to be codified at
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5741.01(H)(9); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.107(a) (Vernon Supp.
1990) (defining the phrase "retailer engaged in business in this state").
151. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6015.5 (West 1987) (emphasis added).
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Using an agent's contacts with the taxing state as a basis for use
tax collection jurisdiction is by no means a new idea. 152 Until National
Geographic, however, what may not have been so clear was whether
a doubly connected nexus was required (i.e., between the vendor and
the taxing state, and between the specific activity to be taxed and
the vendor's in-state activity); a contention that the Court rejected. '3
State legislators ostensibly picked up on the Court's language that
only "some definite link, some minimum connection"'' inthe abstract
need exist with the taxing state. California and several other states
thus have extended this notion to encompass an agent's provision of
support services to an out-of-state vendor. In other words, these states
look to contacts which are derived incidentally from the ordinary
course of the vendor's selling.
In all of the cases in which the Supreme Court found a sufficient
nexus based upon an agent's contacts with the taxing state, the agents
were active solicitors of the vendor's business. 1 5 The sufficiency of
incidental agent contacts involving the delivery of goods, however,
was rejected by the Court in National Bellas Hess and Miller
Brothers.156Furthermore, in virtually all cases where the Court found
a sufficient nexus based on agent contacts, the agents were working
exclusively for the vendor in furthering the vendor's business.'5 7 This
situation is inapposite, for example, to a situation involving a magazine
containing various advertisements, including the vendor's." Something more than the supply of support services must exist.
This distinction is also sound for policy reasons. One can imagine
easily the "chilling effect" on interstate commerce that would occur if
the placement of one advertisement in an out-of-state publication could
subject a seller to recurring compliance obligations and exposure to

152. See generally supra text accompanying notes 33-91 (discussing the historical case law
of the nexus requirement).
153. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing National Geographic Soc'y,
430 U.S. at 631).
154. National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 561.
155. See supra notes 55-58, 72-75 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text (discussing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v.
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939)); supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text (discussing Nelson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 715 (1941); Nelson v. Montgomery
Ward, 312 U.S. 373, reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 716 (1941)); supra notes 72-74 and accompanying
text (discussing Scripto, 362 U.S. at 207); supra notes 80-91 (discussing National Geographic
Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 551).
158. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing newspaper advertising in Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 964 (1954)).
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use tax-related penalties - a situation zealously protected by the
commerce clause.159 Because all enumerated contacts are based on a
relationship to an in-state communications medium, the type of legislation illustrated above does nothing more than transform an otherwise
insufficient communicative nexus into a purportedly sufficient incidental nexus through statutory fiat. Courts will not be fooled so easily.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When confronted with the issue, courts must strike down any application of the two new types of use tax collection statutes discussed
in this article to pure mail order vendors or other pure direct marketers. The foregoing discussion illustrates that United States Supreme
Court decisions do not support the use of an economic presence or
nexus theory as a sole jurisdictional basis for imposing use tax collection duties on out-of-state vendors. As a predicate to the valid exercise
of state taxing jurisdiction under the communicative-nexus version,
current constitutional jurisprudence first requires a showing of sufficient physical presence in the taxing state. With respect to the incidental-contacts version, the predicate is the same; thus, active agent
solicitation must be present, not merely supportive activities.
Sound policy reasons support the Court's view that economic presence alone does not create the required nexus. Standards using communicative and incidental contacts do not achieve any marked degree
of certainty, one goal of due process. With respect to the commerce
clause, compliance with over 6,500 taxing jurisdictions is simply too
burdensome for the majority of the mail order industry's members:
small mail order vendors. On their own initiative, states have legislated
away these federal constitutional safeguards.
The recent wave of new use tax collection provisions does provide,
however, clear manifestations of a current political problem on the
state level. As traditional sources of revenue decline, states are placing
increased importance on sales taxation. As technology advances and
reduces the necessity to display goods locally, the states' number of
in-state sales tax collectors diminishes. This leads to a political dilemma
concerning the decline in state revenue.
On one hand, the states could enforce the use tax against their
own citizens, the individual purchasers, effectively addressing the true
problem: use tax evasion. On the other hand, the states could raise
the tax rates of other tax bases or expand such tax bases. Both
solutions, however, are politically unpalatable. Therefore, for the sake

159.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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of saving their elected positions, state legislators have chosen instead
to reach extrajurisdictionally. They have decided to solve their political
dilemmas by taxing those who are without a vote: the out-of-state
vendors. In doing so, the states are tearing apart the delicate fabric
we call our federalist system.
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